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12:30 25 May 2011

Optimal Unemployment Insurance over Business Cycle


IFS Seminar Room | Institute for Fiscal Studies (link Map)
7 Ridgmount Street | London | WC1E 7AE |

Open to: Academic | Student
Ticketing: Open

Speaker information

Camille Landais, Postdoctoral Fellow, SIEPR Stanford University

This paper characterizes optimal unemployment insurance over the business cycle in a model in which unemployment stems from matching frictions (in booms) and job rationing (in recessions). Job rationing introduces two effects not captured by previous studies. First, job-search efforts have little effect on aggregate unemployment because the number of jobs available is limited, independently of search and matching. Second, while job-search efforts increase the individual probability of ?nding a job, they create a negative externality by reducing other job seekers’ probability of ?nding one of the few available jobs.


Department of Economics - Reception
0207 679 5888 |


Seminar paper