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16:30 - 18:00 19 November 2013

Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets

Location

Room 321 | Drayton House (link Map)
30 Gordon Street | London | WC1H 0AN | United Kingdom

Open to: Academic | Student
Ticketing: Open

Speaker information

Olivier Tercieux

We study efficient and stable mechanisms in many-to-one matching markets when the number of agents is large and individuals' preferences are drawn randomly from a class of distributions allowing for both common value and idiosyncratic components. In this context, as the market growslarge, all Pareto efficient mechanisms (including top trading cycles, serial dictatorship, and their randomized variants) generate total payoffs that converge to the utilitarian upper bound. This result implies that Pareto-efficient mechanisms are asymptotically payoff equivalent in the population distribution sense --- that is, ``up to the renaming of agents.'' If objects' priorities are also randomly drawn but agents' common values for objects are heterogenous, then well-known mechanisms such as deferred acceptance and top trading cycle mechanisms fail either efficiency or stability even in the asymptotic sense.


Contact

Department of Economics - Reception
020 7679 5888 | -


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