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13:00 - 14:00 27 June 2013

Competing Candidates, Competing Interest Groups, and the Efficacy of Political Threats

Location

Room G20 | Drayton House (link Map)
30 Gordon Street | London | WC1H 0AN | United Kingdom

Open to: Academic | Student
Ticketing: Open

Speaker information

Nicolas Motz, UCL

In this paper I analyse a model of electoral competition with political advertising and campaign contributions by multiple interest groups similar to Grossman & Helpman (1996). The main innovation is that interest groups are allowed to commit to general contribution schedules that make their donations to one candidate conditional not only on that candidate's campaign platform, but on all candidates' platforms and even on donations by other interest groups. The main result is that influence on policy is exerted through threats of contributions rather than through actual contributions. This is true even when interest groups have opposing interests. When interests are mutual, interest groups act effectively like one player who combines their spending power. As there are never any positive contributions in equilibrium there is also no possibility of coordination failures between interest groups and equilibrium outcomes are always uniquely determined.


Contact

Department of Economics - Reception
020 7679 5800 | -


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