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12:30 - 13:40 27 June 2012

"Moral hazard and claims deterrence in private disability insurance" (with David Autor and Jonathan Gruber)

Location

LSE Room LRB505 (Morishima Room) | Institute for Fiscal Studies (link Map)
7 Ridgmount Street | London | WC1E 7AE |

Open to: Academic | Student
Ticketing: Open

Speaker information

Mark Duggan, University of Maryland

We provide a detailed analysis of the incidence, duration and determinants of claims made on private Long Term Disability (LTD) policies using a database of approximately 10,000 policies and 1 million workers from a major LTD insurer. We document that LTD claims rates are much lower than claims rates on the public analogue to LTD, the Social Security Disability Insurance program, yet LTD policies have a much higher return-to-work rate among initial claimants. Nevertheless, our analysis indicates that the impact of moral hazard on LTD claims is substantial. Using within firm, over time variation in plan parameters, we find that a higher replacement rate and a shorter waiting time to benefits receipt—also known as the Elimination Period or EP—significantly increase the likelihood that workers claim LTD.


Contact

Institute for Fiscal Studies
020 7291 4800 |


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