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16:30 - 18:00 17 November 2015

Reputation building under uncertain monitoring

Location

Room 321 | Drayton House (link Map)
30 Gordon Street | London | WC1H 0AN | United Kingdom

Open to: Academic | Student
Ticketing: Open

Speaker information

Joyee Deb, Yale

We study a canonical model of reputation in which a long-run player plays a stage-game repeatedly with a sequence of short-run opponents. The long-run player is privately informed about the state of the economy, which determines the monitoring structure in the reputation game. We show that even if actions are identifiable in every state, even with a rich type space, standard reputation results do not obtain. We present necessary and sufficient conditions (on the monitoring structure and type space) to obtain reputation building in this setting. Specifically, reputation building is not possible with only stationary commitment types. However with the inclusion of appropriate dynamic commitment types, reputation building can be sustained.


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